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Abstract
Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an on-line infrastructure. In
particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results.
In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsibility of a mother certification
authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently be collectively isolated from the mCA (e.g., for a remote
mission) but still need the access to a certification authority, the mCA pre-assigns a special role to several nodes
(called servers) that constitute a distributed certification authority (dCA) during the isolated period. We propose
a solution, called DICTATE (DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness), to manage the
dCA. This solution ensures that the dCA always processes a certificate update (or query) request in a finite
amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the dCA responds
to a query request with the most recent version of the queried certificate in a certain probability; this probability
can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but at the expense of higher overhead. Our contribution is twofold: i) a set
of certificate management protocols that allow trading protocol overhead for certificate freshness or the other
way around, and ii) a combination of threshold and identity-based cryptosystems to guarantee the security,
availability, and scalability of the certification function. We describe DICTATE in detail and, by security analysis
and simulations, we show that it is robust against various attacks.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, System design, Security, Public-key infrastructure, Quorum Systems, Simulations
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21 INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks are collections of peered mobile nodes that communicate through wireless links. Such
networks require stringent security protocols to protect their nodes from various attacks [1, 2]. However,
implementing these protocols is difficult because these networks are constructed without using an on-line
infrastructure and because the wireless links are particularly vulnerable. In this paper, we design a secure
and efficient public-key infrastructure (PKI) for ad hoc networks.
Public-key cryptography supports mechanisms that achieve security objectives such as confidentiality, authen-
tication, and nonrepudiation. It can also pave the way for applying symmetric-key cryptography by bootstrapping
a secured channel through mutual authentication and the establishment of a shared secret. However, a carefully
planned PKI1 is necessary to implement these security mechanisms. In the Internet, PKIs (e.g., [3]) usually
involve a certification authority (CA), which is a trusted third party (TTP) that certifies the authenticity of the
binding between a public key and its subject entity. Whereas a CA can be implemented in a centralized server
for a certain authority domain, a distributed implementation [4] could be preferable for improving availability.
As an alternative, PGP [5] is a more flexible PKI that enables users to enjoy public-key cryptography without
any support from a CA.
In ad hoc networks, centralized CAs can work only for small authority domains, since the availability of
such a CA would be problematic in a large domain due to the highly dynamic network topology. Based on
this consideration and on previous results for wired networks, existing proposals for building a PKI in ad hoc
networks can be classified into two main trends: (i) A single authority domain across the whole network with a
distributed implementation of CA [1, 2] and (ii) multiple authority domains of small sizes with a “centralized”
authority for each [6].
In addition to distributing the certification authority, applying the joint authority approach [7, 8] can further
increase the security of a CA in large distributed systems. This approach advocates the combination of an off-line
identification authority (IA) and an on-line revocation authority (RA). The IA authenticates the initial binding
between a public key and its subject entity, and the RA keeps track of the status of certificates issued by the
IA. Thanks to this separation, compromising the on-line authority (which is usually more vulnerable than an
off-line authority) does not enable the adversary to issue certificates to new users, which limits the consequent
damages. In spite of the apparent advantage, no known proposal for ad hoc networks has adopted this approach.
Our proposal improves the joint authority approach to build a PKI for ad hoc networks. Our approach uses
1In this paper, the term PKI is used in a broad sense. It refers to public-key management systems offering basic functions of certificate
(or key) issuance, validation and revocation.
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3an off-line IA to issue initial certificates and also to assign special nodes (or servers) to constitute an on-line
distributed RA. We propose a DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness (DICTATE) to
manage the on-line RA. DICTATE applies threshold cryptography to distribute trust among the RA servers.
It also makes use of the services provided by PILOT, a group communication system we proposed in [9]. To
issue a (revocation) certificate, DICTATE requires a defined number of RA servers to sign the certificate and
then replicates it in a quorum of RA servers. In response to a certificate query, DICTATE forwards it again
to a quorum. Our underlying PILOT system guarantees that one quorum forms a probabilistic intersection with
another, so that in practice a certificate query acquires, with a high probability, the most recent status of the
targeted certificate. Our solution is network-friendly: DICTATE can tune the protocol performance on-line to a
desired tradeoff between the freshness (of a certificate status) and overhead (to achieve the freshness), according
to the level of the required freshness and network resource consumption.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the existing solutions and summarizes
the motivations for our work. Section 3 details the problem to be solved and the system model. Section 4
presents our joint authority design and DICTATE protocols. Section 5 analyzes DICTATE against different
attacks. Section 6 simulates DICTATE and compares the results with analytical results. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 RELATED WORK
This section surveys PKIs in both wired networks and ad hoc networks. It shows that certain principles can
be inherited from wired networks for implementing a PKI in ad hoc networks, but a direct migration would not
perform well. We further summarize the rationale that leads to the design of our protocols at the end.
2.1 PKIs in Wired Networks
The X.509-based public-key infrastructure [3], a representative of PKIs in wired networks, implicitly assumes
centralized CAs. In order to scale across large networks, different CAs are organized into a hierarchical structure,
in which a certain end entity always has a trusted CA, or “root” CA. An entity, upon verifying a certificate, must
trace along a certificate path from its root CA to the CA that has signed the certificate. This tracing procedure
leads to a long delay for verification, and individual CAs, whose compromise would paralyze the certification
function of their domains, also appear to be single points of failure for security. The distributed implementation
of a CA (e.g., Ω [4] and COCA [10]) improves the availability of the certification function by organizing different
certification servers into a peer-based structure. It also enhances the robustness of the authority against a certain
amount of server failures through the use of threshold cryptography. However, all these benefits are obtained at
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4the cost of additional protocol complexity. On one hand, certification servers have to be synchronized to ensure
that a query returns the correct certificate. On the other hand, secret share refreshing is necessary to defend the
CA against mobile2 adversaries [11], but the proactive refreshing scheme is prohibitively complex to implement
in asynchronous systems [12].
PGP [5], an alternative to the PKI based on trusted authorities, provides practical security to protect low-
value communications, such as e-mails. PGP is based on referral certification, which allows multiple users to
“recommend” a certain user by signing certificates of its public key. This scheme is not perfectly secure because,
for example, dishonest users may issue false certificates to cheat other users. The third solution to implement a
PKI, SPKI/SDSI [13], has an egalitarian design similar to PGP. It circumvents the dependency on global name
spaces, to which both X.509 and PGP are subject, with the concept of linked local name spaces.
2.2 PKIs in Ad Hoc Networks
The need for a PKI in an ad hoc network is due to the security requirements of various mechanisms, especially
routing (e.g., [14, 15, 16]). However, the distinctive features of ad hoc networks lead to designs of PKIs that
are different from those in wired networks.
Zhou and Haas [1] explore the issue of distributed CA in ad hoc networks, with the assumption of a single
authority domain across the network. Their solution achieves availability by replicating certificates in multiple
servers and employs threshold cryptography to thwart various attacks. However, [1] does not contain a full
description of protocols to maintain and control the access to the distributed CA. Luo et al. [2, 17] extend
the work of Zhou and Haas by distributing the authority throughout the network. Their proposal focuses on
performance: only localized protocols are used to access the certification function. Unfortunately, the on-line
identification service provided by [2] seems to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack [18], where an attacker can take
enough shares within the CA by claiming several identities and can thus reconstruct the system’s private key.
Hubaux et al. [19, 6] follow another approach by assuming each node to be its own authority domain. As a
counterpart of PGP in ad hoc networks, the self-organized public-key management in [6] allows nodes to certify
each other. With the assumption of transitive trust among nodes, appropriate certificate chains are found to verify
the certificate of a public key. The disadvantage with such a scheme is that the assumption of a transitive trust
could be too strong for mobile networks.
2This term refers to an adversary that may corrupt only a limited number of nodes during each time interval, but may corrupt different
sets of nodes for different time intervals. Thus, mobile refers to movements (in terms of corruption) between nodes, and not to geographic
movements.
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5Recently, several proposals have extended the aforementioned approaches in different ways. Extensions to
Zhou and Haas’s work usually try to solve two problems left open in [1]: (i) how to select the CA servers and
(ii) how to maintain the CA. Yi and Kravets [20] suggest selectively assigning powerful nodes as CA servers
and apply multiple unicastings for accessing CA. They do not explicitly explain how the initial identification is
performed when a node joins a network for the first time. Bechler et al. [21] introduce a cluster-based architecture
for supporting a distributed CA. However, the on-line identification service relies on referral certifications from
existing network members, which could weaken the security level of the system. Khalili et al. [22] apply an
identity-based approach instead of the certificate-based one [20, 21]. They use a set of pre-configured nodes
to form the distributed authority and apply localized protocols, similar to those of [2], for the key generation
service. Unfortunately, key revocations appear to be difficult because the key generation service refuses to issue
keys for a particular identity more than once in order to thwart identity spoofing. An extension to the trust
model in [6] is described in [23]. The trust chain and recommendation protocol used in [6] are again applied but
supplemented by a reference protocol. This solution does not commit to perfect security since it is dedicated to
low-value communications. A downside of such protocols is that they do not address the security issues with a
network-oriented point of view (for example, the topology of a trust graph does not match the changing network
topology), which could impair their viability in ad hoc networks.
A location-limited channel is used in [24, 25] for pre-authentication. These proposals are perfect for personal
area networks or indoor networks but have difficulty in scaling to larger networks. Cˇapkun et al. [26] rely on
the node mobility as a vehicle to extend the range of the location-limited channel in mobile networks; however,
the time to establish a security association between two nodes can be long. Montenegro and Castelluccia [27]
describe a way to bind an identity with its public key: the hash of the public key is used as part of the IP
address. Unfortunately, a node would have to change its “name” (or identity) upon key revocation.
A common weakness of PKIs in ad hoc networks is the lack of proper revocation mechanisms. While proposals
in [22, 21, 23] do not address the certificate revocation, the solutions in [2, 6, 20] rely on proactive mechanisms
to push a certificate revocation list (CRL) to other nodes. Although no quantitative evaluation is provided in
[2, 20], there is no doubt that proactive pushing, by flooding the network, consumes network resources constantly.
Therefore, an on-demand scheme that queries the status of a certificate in question would be more suitable for
ad hoc networks.
2.3 Lessons from the Past
According to the experiences from the previous work mentioned above, we summarize our design rationale
for the PKI in ad hoc networks as follows:
December 7, 2004 DRAFT
6• Authentication techniques differ in the level of protections that they provide for the targeted communications.
Relying on a trusted authority yields a high-level protection to secure high-value communications in large-
scale networks.
• Performing initial identifications with a full on-line certification service is questionable. The joint authority
approach that integrates an off-line IA and an on-line distributed RA can achieve both security and
availability of the CA.
• The proactive share refreshing, which is already expensive enough in wired networks, is not suitable for ad
hoc networks (except an extreme case [2] where localized protocols apply). Certain out-of-band mechanisms
have to be used for refreshing key shares.
• The network performance should be kept in mind when addressing security issues. Security protection can
be somewhat sacrificed to spare network resources in some cases.
• Certificate revocation is an important but often neglected CA service. In wireless networks, it becomes even
more significant because (suspected) compromises could happen more often.
3 GOAL AND MODEL
This section states the problem to be solved and models the considered environment.
3.1 Problem Statement
We consider a relatively large-scale ad hoc network (consisting of tens or even hundreds of nodes) with a
random mobility pattern, i.e., nodes moving independently within a given field. The network (real life examples
include networks temporarily built for rescue or exploration operations) has intermittent connections to a mother
certification authority (or mCA), which is a trusted authority connected to the backbone with its public data
(including its public key) known to all wireless nodes. When the network is disconnected from the mCA (e.g.,
to perform a rescue operation), it requires a CA that serves requests from nodes to update (or revoke)3 their
public key or to query public key certificates of other nodes. We first give the three properties of a secure CA
in such a network as follows:
• Liveness: The CA always processes a request in a finite amount of time.
• Safety: An adversary is never able to forge a certificate.
• Freshness: A query to the CA returns the most recent status of a targeted certificate.
3Since the first public key of a node is certified off-line, a new public key proposed afterward is always considered to update, or
revoke, the previous one. Without introducing ambiguity, we hereafter use update and revoke (or revocation) interchangeably.
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7Then we specify our CA with probabilistic freshness: it meets the liveness and safety properties, and it ensures
the freshness property with a probability that is termed Fd, or freshness degree.
For any correct nodes, our goals are to: (i) make the CA compliant with the specifications above, (ii) provide
a certain flexibility for the CA to tune the protocol performance (with respect to Fd and the overhead) on-line
to the desired tradeoff, (iii) incur reasonable overhead, which is defined as the network load [9], even in the
case of a high freshness requirement, and (iv) keep all protocols transparent to a human user.
3.2 System and Adversary Model
We assume that each node owns a unique identity. We also assume that, in the network, there is a subset
(typically 10% to 20% of the network)4 N (|N| = n) of securely protected and computationally powerful nodes
(which the mCA can identify and will use to constitute a distributed CA). A subset T ⊂ N can be compromised
during a certain period of time, where |T| = t < n/3.5 The remaining part of N consists of a set C of correct
nodes.
For the adversary model, we consider the following attacks that could be mounted by a malicious node:
• Impersonation: A node pretends to be someone else to submit a certificate update.
• Denial of Service (DoS) : A node tries to slow down the CA by clogging the resources (especially commu-
nication resources).
• Misc: A node launches eavesdropping, message insertion, corruption, deletion, and replay attacks.
In addition to these attacks, a compromised node belonging to the set N may exhibit Byzantine failure, i.e.,
deviate arbitrarily from the (DICTATE) protocol specification.
4 OUR SOLUTION: JOINT AUTHORITY AND DICTATE
As we mentioned before, the joint authority approach integrates an off-line IA and an on-line RA. Our solution
uses the mCA (which is connected to the backbone) as the off-line IA and lets the mCA assign the set N of
special nodes to constitute a distributed CA (dCA hereafter) that performs the role of the on-line RA (Fig. 1).
The nodes belonging to the dCA are named servers, and all nodes outside the dCA are named clients. The
mCA controls the admission of a node (either a server or a client) to the network at its command, through the
4It is not our goal in this paper to find the optimal size for this set, but we note that generally the larger the size is, the more heavily
the network is loaded, whereas the load on individual nodes becomes smaller.
5Although probabilistic quorum systems [28] (unlike Byzantine quorum systems [29]) still work if t ≥ n/3, and a threshold
cryptosystem requires only t < 1/2, the system performance degrades dramatically when t goes beyond 1/3. Therefore, we require
t < n/3 even though our CA is based on the principle of probabilistic quorum systems.
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8issuance of a certificate that asserts the binding between the identity and initial public key of the node. When
the network is disconnected from the mCA, nodes submit their requests to the dCA. On one hand, a query
request returns the public key certificate of another node. A node does not always query a certificate in the case
of secure communication; it performs a query only if it suspects the validity of the certificate that it obtains
directly from another node. On the other hand, an update request updates a node’s public key certificate stored
in the dCA. The dCA guarantees the legitimacy of an update only if the node who submits the request does
not lose its private key or its private key has not been compromised, otherwise the node has to re-identify itself
with the mCA through out-of-band mechanisms.
Mother CA
dCA servers
Mother CA
dCA servers
dCA clients
s
c
c
c
c
cc
c
s
s
s
s
s
.
.
Public key of dCA
Identities of all dCA servers
.
.
dCA private key shares
Private keys for
individual dCA servers
Server purgation and
renewal of compromised
server keys
Refreshment of
CA private key shares
Fig. 1. Operating principles of the joint CA: (a) initialization and (b) checktime.
Our dCA has a public/private key pair. This public-key pair is based on RSA.6 The public key, which bears
a certificate issued by the mCA, is known to the whole network. The private key of the dCA is shared among
the dCA servers by a (t+1, n) robust threshold cryptosystem [30]. A credential generated with the private key
testifies the authority of the whole dCA. Each dCA server, like a usual node, has its own public/private key
pair. We apply an identity-based scheme [31], and a corresponding signature scheme [32], for this public-key
pair and make the identities of all dCA servers publicly known, such that any network node knows the public
key of a dCA server. The private key of a server is generated by the mCA; it only represents the authority of an
individual server. We refer to Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for the usage of this cryptosystem. The system initialization
is illustrated in Fig. 1 (a).
Periodically,7 there is a checktime, as shown in Fig. 1 (b), at which the dCA servers (physically) go back to
the mCA for a “purgation” (only dCA servers should go through this procedure; clients can still perform their
6The threshold cryptosystem based on RSA allows a non-interactive signing protocol, which would not be the case, for example, of
an ElGamal-like threshold cryptosystem.
7The length of this period depends on the time spent for a given remote operation of the network. For instance, a one-month operation
could require the mCA to “purge” the dCA every one week.
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9remote operations). During the checktime, the mCA, through out-of-band mechanisms, detects compromised
servers and has them re-initiated or substituted by new ones; it also refreshes the secret shared among the dCA.
Since on-line detection of compromised servers is hard and cooperative detection schemes [33] may suffer from
blackmail attacks, off-line detection seems to be the only way to guarantee security. Note that server identities
are fixed, and the key revocation of a server is done by using the combination of the identity and the time stamp
corresponding to a certain checktime interval as the public key [31]. It is clear from the above descriptions
that, unlike the traditional joint authority approach, the mCA not only provides identification service but also
manages the dCA. This explains why we use the terms mCA and dCA instead of IA and RA in this paper.
The interactions between nodes (including servers and clients) and the mCA (e.g, identification, key generation,
and refreshing shared secrets) are well-defined in existing proposals [34, 30, 31], so we do not discuss them
in detail; in the remainder of the paper, we rather focus on DICTATE, which maintains the on-line part of our
certification service (i.e., the dCA). We first introduce the principles of PILOT [9], the basis of DICTATE, then
we describe operations of DICTATE in detail. We avoid making any assumption on the unicast routing protocol
since the choice of a solution is influenced by parameters such as network size, mobility patterns, traffic patterns,
etc. Although PILOT is designed to work with a reactive protocol (e.g., DSR [35] or AODV [36]), it can easily
be adapted to any other routing protocol, including proactive and hybrid ones (e.g., OLSR [37] and ZRP [38]).
4.1 Overview of PILOT
PILOT [9] is a group communication system that provides services for multicast and data replication. The
parts of our PILOT system used to implement DICTATE are illustrated by the grey part in Fig. 2. PILOT is a
two-layer system. It has a probabilistic multicast protocol, Route Drive Gossip (RDG), as its basis. The protocol
is gossip-based in nature: it proceeds round by round and the receivers in each round are chosen randomly
(weighted according to the length of the routing path); they relay packets to the receivers of the later round(s)
(we allow a packet to be relayed once only to the receivers of the next round in this paper). This protocol
Unicast Routing Protocol
Route Driven Gossip (RDG)
PAN
Distributed Certification Authority
( )DICTATE
Fig. 2. The protocol structure of DICTATE: it is built upon PILOT (the grey part).
guarantees that the reliability degree, defined as the fraction of a multicast group receiving a given packet, is
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predictable in a probabilistic sense. The fanout, F , is a very important parameter related to RDG; it refers to the
number of receivers chosen by a certain sender in a round and thus strongly influences the protocol reliability.
Upon this layer, the Probabilistic quorum system for Ad hoc Networks (PAN) provides reliable data sharing. It
assumes a special group of nodes to store the shared data in a replicated manner. Any node belonging to the
group is termed server, and the rest of the nodes are termed clients. A data query or update is directed to an
arbitrary server, and its dissemination within the group is performed by the PAN server query protocol or update
protocol (the two protocols differ in that a query requires a reply and an update does not). Since the PAN server
query and update protocols rely on RDG, the probability that a query acquires the most recent update of the
corresponding data object is again predictable and rather high in practice. Certain parameters, including F , have
to be set when a primitive in PILOT is invoked. These parameters determine the protocol performance, in terms
of reliability and overhead [9]. Previous approaches for guaranteeing the reliability of queries and updates in a
certification service apply either reliable group communication systems [4] or Byzantine quorum systems [10].
These approaches incur too much overhead and are thus not practical in ad hoc networks. Our approach of
building a certification service upon probabilistic quorum systems provides a way of flexibly trading reliability
for efficiency.
4.2 Protocol Overview
In this section, we summarize the main operations of DICTATE (Fig. 3). These operations are classified into
external and internal (with respect to the dCA server group) protocols, according to the entities that are involved.
The rationale behind these operations is explained in Section 4.3.
The notations used throughout all subsequent sections are as follows:
s, sid : DICTATE (or dCA) server and its identity.
c, cid : DICTATE (or dCA) client and its identity.
〈m〉k: message m with signature signed by key k (identity-based signature) of a server.
[m]k: message m with signature signed by key k (RSA signature).
KD: public key of DICTATE (or dCA).
kD, kDs: private key of DICTATE (or dCA) and key share, respectively.
K?, k?: public key and private key of node “?”, respectively. “?” can be c, s, or a.
[CtK ]k: certificate of public key K signed by private key k. The format of its data part is [cid ,K, v], where
cid identifies the owner of K and v is the version number. Note that the certificate is not timestamped,
because it is not trivial to agree on a common timestamp among a set of servers who sign the certificate.
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4.2.1 DICTATE External Protocol
This part of DICTATE runs between clients and servers.
Access Control: When a client c wants to access DICTATE, it tries to contact an arbitrary DICTATE server s,
and they exchange the following messages:
c→ s : Ac = [cid , [CtKc ]kD , rtype]kc
c← s : As = 〈ok〉ks
where rtype refers to the request type (update or query). The server s admits the access of the client c with As
only if Ac is proved to be valid. After successfully finishing this interaction, this server becomes the agent of
the client for this specific request.
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Certificate Updating
Certificate Replication
Client Query and Server Reply 
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Query Forwarding
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s Server
(a)
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(c)
Fig. 3. DICTATE operations: public key registration through: (a) Certificate Update and (b) Certificate Replication; obtaining the public
key certificate of another node through (c) Certificate Query.
Client Request and Server Reply: A client sends certificate update and replication requests to revoke its current
public key and to register a new one, and it sends a certificate query to get the current public key certificate of
another node.
To register a new public key, a client c first generates a new public/private key pair K ′c/k′c and then sends
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an update request to its agent a:
c→ a : Uc = [cid , [K ′c]kc ]k′c ( in Fig. 3 (a))
where kc is the current private key whose corresponding public key Kc is to be revoked. Upon completing the
task of certificate update, the agent responds with the following message:
c← a : Ua = [CtK′c ]kD ( in Fig. 3 (a))
The client c verifies [CtK′c ]kD using KD. If the certificate is valid, c sends a replication request to a, so that
the certificate will be stored in the dCA for future queries:
c→ a : Rc = [cid , [CtK′c ]kD ,Fd]kc ( in Fig. 3 (b))
where Fd indicates the required freshness degree (defined in Section 3.1). Finally, the agent a provides its client
c with evidence that it has faithfully respected the protocol:
c← a : Ra = 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks1 , 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks2 , · · · ( in Fig. 3 (b))
where 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks1 , 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks2 , · · · is a list of signatures generated by servers that receive Rc; it proves
that those servers have indeed received the new certificate. Though an abuse of concept, here we refer to
〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks1 only as the signature for the certificate [CtK′c ]kD .
To obtain the public key certificate of a node, a client c sends a query request to its agent a:
c→ a : Qc = [cid , ˆcid ]kc ( in Fig. 3 (c))
where ˆcid is the identity of the owner of the queried public key certificate. A server s that receives the request
replies directly to c with the following message:
c← s : Qs = 〈[CtK ˆcid ]kD〉ks ( in Fig. 3 (c))
4.2.2 DICTATE Internal Protocol
This part of DICTATE runs among servers.
Certificate Update: An agent a forwards a valid client update to several servers via the PAN server query8
protocol with a message 〈Uc, [CtKc ]kD〉ka ( in Fig. 3 (a)) and waits for enough copies of partially
signed certificates 〈[CtK′c ]kDs〉ks to come back ( in Fig. 3 (a)). The agent then tries to combine all
these certificates to create a valid one, [CtK′c ]kD , signed by the private key of DICTATE, and returns this new
certificate back to the client via the message Ua.
8Although this protocol is a part of the DICTATE server update protocol, it invokes the underlying query protocol of PAN because it
expects a reply from each receiver.
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Certificate Replication: The agent, upon receiving a replication request Rc from its client, replicates the
certificate via the PAN server protocols with a message 〈Rc〉ka ( in Fig. 3 (b)). As a consequence,
a quorum ΘU (|ΘU | = 5 in Fig. 3 (b)) of servers receives 〈Rc〉ka . The agent then expects acknowledgements
{〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks} : s ∈ ΘU¯ from a set ΘU¯ (|ΘU¯ | = 3 in Fig. 3 (b)) of servers ( in Fig. 3 (b)), where
ΘU¯ ⊆ ΘU . The size of ΘU and ΘU¯ is determined by the required freshness degree Fd. Finally, the agent replies
to the client with Ra.
Query Forwarding: An agent a forwards a valid client query to several servers via the PAN server update
protocol with a message 〈Qc〉ka ( in Fig. 3 (c)), but it does not expect replies from other servers. The
replies Qs from a quorum ΘQ¯ (|ΘQ¯| = 4 in Fig. 3 (c)) of servers are directly sent back to the client.
Detailed proofs of the protocol compliance with our specification are provided in Section 5. Here we only
give some intuitive ideas on the relationship between the freshness degree Fd and the quorum sizes:
Fd = Pr{ΘU ∩ΘQ¯ 6⊆ T} (1)
while Fd = 1 iff
|ΘU¯ |+ |ΘQ¯| ≥ n+ t+ 1 (2)
Note that ∃ server s : s ∈ ΘU ∨ s 6∈ ΘU¯ could happen, because a reply from s to a might not get through
due to the unreliable routing protocol. It is enough that ΘU ∩ ΘQ¯ 6⊆ T for probabilistic guarantee (1), but a
deterministic guarantee (2) requires ΘU¯ ∩ΘQ¯ 6⊆ T.
4.3 Protocol Rationale
This section explains the underlying principles of the DICTATE protocols.
4.3.1 DICTATE External Protocol
Access Control: A server verifies the validity of Ac by checking whether: (i) the certificate [CtKc ]kD is valid
and matches cid , (ii) the signature by kc is verifiable with Kc, and (iii) the client is authorized, by the access
control policy, to perform rtype . We do not detail the access control policy in this paper. This policy can be
specified according to different application requirements (e.g., the revocation period of individual public keys
should be larger than a given amount of time to reduce the system overhead). As we use an identity-based
cryptosystem for the DICTATE server key, a client can easily verify the validity of a message from any server
with the knowledge of the identity of that server and a local clock loosely synchronized with the checktime.
In order to facilitate the possible retransmission of Ac (considering the unpredictable connectivity of ad hoc
networks), we avoid using a challenge-response identification protocol. Although the protocol that we use seems
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to be vulnerable to a replay attack due to the lack of nonce to keep the freshness of a message, an adversary
launching such an attack would gain nothing since it would fail to provide a valid request later on.
Client Request and Corresponding Reply: The role of the update request Uc is to prove to the agent that the
client c owns the private keys kc and k′c corresponding to the current public key Kc and the newly proposed
public key K ′c, respectively. The agent is able to check the validity of Uc given the [CtKc ]kD transferred in the
access control phase.
If an agent were trustworthy, it could be asked to directly perform the replication after obtaining [CtK′c ]kD ,
without notifying its client. However, we want to protect the client against possible compromise of the agent.
The server reply Ua allows the client to check the validity of the new certificate before asking the agent to
replicate it. Also, each server s that receives the replication request Rc is required to provide the “receipt”
〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks to the client. This scheme defends DICTATE against a compromised agent who pretends to be
correct by finishing the certificate update task but fails to replicate the certificate to other DICTATE servers
afterward. In addition, the client mentions its required freshness degree9 Fd, so that the agent can set proper
parameters to invoke the underlying protocols according to the requested degree. There is no way for both a
replication and a query to request a freshness degree, otherwise the system performance becomes unpredictable.
Although greedy clients might always request the highest freshness degree (i.e., Fd = 1), which incurs a large
protocol overhead, DICTATE discourages greed by means of an implicit “self-castigation”: the higher Fd, the
longer the delay of the response. Note that a lower freshness degree does not mean a lower level of security;
we refer to Section 5.2.2 for detailed explanations.
A query request Qc is propagated through the agent, as it needs to go through certain sanity checks. But the
reply should not go through the agent, otherwise a compromised agent could return bogus information to the
client. Therefore, the client should collect all replies and select the most recent version of the required certificate
by itself.
4.3.2 DICTATE Internal Protocol
In previous literature (e.g., [10]), it is considered very important that a CA be independent from other network
nodes. This requirement improves the scalability of a network because, for example, a client does not need to
be informed about the revocation of a server public key. DICTATE is also divided into two parts, i.e., external
and internal, for the same purpose. However, since we do not want to trust an agent (the bridge between the
two parts), we would like a client to be able to verify the response from any server. This explains why we apply
9This value is set by an application without involving a human user, based on the value of the communication that will use the key
later.
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an identity-based public-key system for DICTATE servers: it grants the ability of verifying servers’ responses
to a client without jeopardizing the network scalability. Alternatively, a solution can be based on the concept of
Byzantine Fault Tolerance [10]. This solution also assumes no trust on servers and lets a client access a set of
agents (t + 1 in the case of t possible compromised servers) to “mask” the failure; although this scheme may
perform well in wired networks, it leaves the certification service open to easily launched resource-clogging DoS
attacks in wireless networks, and causes a well-behaved client to experience a very long delay for a request.
No underlying secure group communication scheme (e.g., [39]) is needed to support DICTATE. The system
is built upon PILOT, which is in turn based directly on unicast routing; therefore it can secure itself with the
prerequisite that the public key of each server is known to the whole network.
Certificate Update: An agent a signs the update request Uc and the previous certificate [CtKc ]kD from its
client c and disseminates this message within DICTATE via the PAN server query protocol.10 Each server again
verifies the validity of Uc, in the same way the agent did. A server s, upon validating 〈Uc〉ka from a, updates
the certificate CtKc by increasing the version number v as v = v + 1 and substituting Kc with K ′c. Then it
generates a partially signed certificate [CtK′c ]kDs and sends it back to a with a message 〈[CtK′c ]kDs〉ks .
Determining the parameters (including the fanout F , see Section 4.1) to invoke PAN is a key issue to ensuring
a successful completion of the threshold signing procedure, because an agent should collect at least t+1 partially
signed certificates to obtain a valid certificate signed by the private key of DICTATE. According to the analysis
provided in Section 5.2.2, the agent can decide on values of certain parameters by which the PAN server query
protocol reaches more than t+1 servers. The agent might need to invoke this procedure more than once before
finishing.
The other issue is how to transfer the responses to a query (with respect to PAN) back to an agent. This
problem is common to all internal protocols. In [9], we suggest a direct call to the unicast routing primitive. The
strengths of this approach are: (i) the complexity of the protocols is low and (ii) a compromised server cannot
block a transmission. Unfortunately, several parallel transmissions to a common destination may congest the
network. Reverse path forwarding is an alternative. As illustrated in Fig. 3 (a), a reply follows the tree created
in the dissemination phase back to the agent and there are packet-level aggregations at internal vertices of the
tree. This approach improves the protocol efficiency if the percentage of compromised servers is low, but suffers
from a high protocol complexity. Even worse, a compromised server s launching a DoS attack by blocking the
transmission in the reply phase can greatly reduce the efficiency of the protocol, especially when s is close to
10This protocol will be used for several purposes in DICTATE. Such flexibility is granted by a callback procedure [9] included in
PAN, which can be defined to retrieve any information (e.g., [CtK′c ]kDs ) from the upper layer (DICTATE in this case).
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the agent. We suggest that an agent switches between unicast routing and reverse path forwarding based on the
estimation of the percentage of compromised servers.
Certificate Replication: This protocol is built upon both the PAN server update protocol and the PAN server query
protocol. The parameters for invoking PAN are set to meet the freshness requirement Fd of the client. How to
estimate the size of the resulting quorum ΘU under certain parameters is described in Section 5.2.2. Each server,
upon receiving the message 〈Rc〉ka , verifies its validity and then stores the certificate [CtK′c ]kD . If the client
requests the highest freshness degree, the PAN server query protocol is invoked to require a reply 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks
from each server s ∈ ΘU , and the resulting reply quorum ΘU¯ should respect Equation (2); otherwise the PAN
server update protocol is invoked. In the latter case, replies are only required from those servers receiving a
replication request directly from the agent, which is already enough to prove the agent’s compliance with the
protocol; the resulting freshness degree is estimated by Equation (1).
Query Forwarding: The agent’s task is trivial in this protocol. It simply forwards a valid query request to other
servers via the PAN server update protocol. The reason we still involve an agent is twofold: (i) the underlying
PAN is designed like this in order to weaken its correlation with other network nodes and (ii) certain sanity
checks can thus be performed by the agent (e.g., to improve the robustness against resource clogging DoS attacks
launched by malicious clients). Each server receiving the query request replies directly to the client with its own
copy of the certificate, if the query is valid (proved by checking the signature of the agent). The client waits for
a certain period of time until it collects the replies from a quorum ΘQ¯ of servers. The minimum size expected
for ΘQ¯ is |ΘQ¯|min , which is set by DICTATE and known to all nodes; it cannot be modified by a client (in
contrast to the situation of |ΘU¯ | whose value can be modified by a client through Fd). Within this collection,
the certificate with the highest version number is chosen as the response to this query.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security of DICTATE by considering malicious clients and compromised servers
separately.
5.1 Protection from Malicious Clients
Malicious clients have no way to impersonate other nodes, because a server can verify the identity of a client
by checking the ownership of the private key corresponding to a certified public key. Hence, a malicious client
cannot impair the safety property.11 All exchanged messages are authenticated (signed by their senders) but do
11A bogus certificate update could be disseminated within DICTATE if this update request were admitted by a compromised agent.
Since this attack has the same effect as an agent propagating a fictitious update or replica, we refer to Section 5.2 for a detailed analysis.
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not require confidentiality, so attacks such as eavesdropping and message corruption cannot degrade the security
of DICTATE. However, DICTATE can suffer from DoS attacks launched by clients replaying certain requests to
cram the service queue. Defending against such attacks is difficult, considering that a correct client might have
to “replay” its own requests due to the losses of corresponding replies. Actually, DICTATE already decreases the
risk of such a DoS attack by involving only one agent for each request. Another kind of DoS attack is routing
disruption [14]. Fortunately, the liveness property of DICTATE can be guaranteed, provided that, between a
sender and a receiver, there exists at least one routing path that contains no malicious nodes.
5.2 Defense against Compromised Servers
The attacks performed by a given compromised server vary with the role of that server.
5.2.1 Compromised Agents
A compromised agent may decline to serve a request for a client. A client can detect such an attack by setting a
timer for each request and can change the agent should the timer expire. If an agent fulfilled the task of certificate
update but tried to cheat its client without following up the replication, it would fail to provide evidences
〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks1 , 〈[CtK′c ]kD〉ks2 , · · · . In both cases, the liveness property of DICTATE is ensured, provided that
the client eventually finds some correct server as its agent. A compromised agent may also provide fictitious
requests (or replies) to other servers (or its clients). Such behavior does not compromise the safety property
of DICTATE, because a message receiver can always verify the validity of the message signed by its original
sender. Although fictitious requests disseminated by a compromised agent do reduce the service capacity of
DICTATE, this kind of DoS attack can be easily detected, so that correct servers may convoke an emergency
checktime in order to purge the compromised server.
5.2.2 Compromised Common Servers
We call a common server a server that does not have the role of the agent for a given request. A compromised
common server can issue partially signed certificates of any bitstring. DICTATE defends itself against this attack
by using a (t+1, n) threshold cryptosystem, such that the liveness and safety properties are guaranteed as long
as the total number of compromised servers is no more than t. Such a server can also behave as a malicious
node to disrupt routing; we refer to Section 5.1 for related discussions.
In particular, compromised common servers can deviate from the protocol requirements by omitting the
verification of all replicas (which leads to a later reply to a query with an obsolete certificate) or by simply
not storing or forwarding a replica. We consider these behaviors to be DoS attacks that we term inaction DoS,
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or iDoS. Since DICTATE is built upon a probabilistic quorum system, the degree Fd that iDoS attacks will
not compromise the freshness property of DICTATE is the probability that ∃s : s ∈ C ∩ ΘU ∩ ΘQ¯ (i.e., there
exists at least one correct server that receives both a replica and a later query to the replica), as expressed in
Equation (1). In this sense, DICTATE can be considered as a special instance of (b, ε) dissemination quorum
systems [28] (b = t and ε = 1−Fd in our case), innovating on the system design with an asymmetric quorum
construction and a randomized quorum size [9]. The estimation of Fd is expressed as follows:
Fd ≥
r¯∑
r=0
n∑
i=0
1− (n−|ΘrU ||ΘQ¯|min)( n
|ΘQ¯|min
)
 νr(i)pr (3)
where νr is the probability distribution of |ΘrU | (i.e., νr(i) = Pr{|ΘrU | = i}), and pr is the probability that a
query occurs r + 1 rounds12 later than when the considered certificate was replicated. Note that both |ΘrU | and
νr are functions of r. In order to simplify the case, we compute only the lower bound of Fd by plugging in
the minimum value of |ΘQ¯| set by DICTATE. Now we show how to calculate νr with a recurrence relation
defined by a Markov chain. Note that the Markov chain is 2-dimansional because the number of servers that
will receive a message in the next round depends on the increase in the number of servers that have received
the message in the current round (see Section 4.1 for details). Let Sr = |ΘrU | and Sr be a vector [Sr, Sr−1]Tr≥0
for brevity; the distribution of Sr is estimated with the following recurrence relation, with the initial condition
Pr{S0 = [1, 0]T } = 1:
Pr{Sr+1 =
[
j
i
]
} =
i∑
i1=0
(
n− i
j − i
)
(1− qi−i1)j−iq(i−i1)(n−j)Pr{Sr =
[
i
i1
]
}
νr(i) =
i∑
i1=0
Pr{Sr =
[
i
i1
]
} (4)
where
q = 1−
(
F
n− 1
)(
n− t
n− 1
)
EH [(1− pf )H ] (5)
is the probability that a certain server does not receive the propagated message in a given gossip round (recall
that F is the fanout, see Section 4.1). This expression takes into account the probability that either (i) the server
is not chosen as a gossip destination, (ii) the server is compromised (we assume that a compromised server drops
any message it receives), or (iii) the message fails to reach its destination. pf is an identical and independent
probability of failure for each node along a routing path in a certain network environment, and H is a random
variable representing the length of an arbitrarily chosen routing path. We refer to [9] for detailed discussions.
12The duration of a round is a parameter of our underlying gossip-based protocol [9].
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DICTATE is not limited to the probabilistic semantics of the freshness. A deterministic assurance can be
provided by meeting the requirement of Equation 2 such that |ΘU¯ ∩ΘQ¯| ≥ t+ 1 and thus ΘU¯ ∩ΘQ¯ includes
at least one correct server. In this case, DICTATE becomes an instance of strict dissemination quorum systems
[29]. Of course, such a protocol setting incurs much higher overhead than that of a probabilistic protocol. As we
mentioned in Section 4.3.1, a lower freshness degree does not mean a lower level of security. Since DICTATE
provides an on-line revocation service, the goal of a client that queries the status of a given certificate is to check
the validity of the corresponding public key obtained from the other client. Although there is a rare chance of
obtaining an incorrect status due to the probabilistic nature of DICTATE, it does not compromise the security
of the revocation service but only reduces its efficiency (because an incorrect status prevents the client from
using a correct public key before the client completing a successful query).
6 SIMULATIONS
In this section, we verify the performance of DICTATE with respect to the freshness degree Fd, under the
iDoS attacks launched by compromised servers.
6.1 Parameters and Assumptions
We use ns-2 [40] with the Monarch Project wireless and mobile extensions. This simulator provides both
implementations of ad hoc routing protocols (we use DSR as an example) and wireless MAC, based on the
Lucent WaveLAN IEEE 802.11 product, with a 2Mbps transmission rate and a nominal range of 250m.
We simulate an ad hoc network with 100 nodes in a square area of 1km2. The movement pattern is defined
by the “random waypoint” model [41], and we update it by setting a positive minimum speed (as suggested by
[42]). We pair the mobility parameters, such that each node has a maximum speed of 2m/s, 5m/s, 10m/s, and
20m/s, and a corresponding average pause time of 10s, 20s, 40s, and 80s, respectively.
In our simulations, the dCA contains 19 servers, which means that the system can sustain up to 6 = (19−1)/3
compromised servers. The dCA servers are assumed to be predefined. The external protocols and the internal
certificate update protocol of our DICTATE are omitted to simplify the interpretation of the results. Certificate
replications and queries are assumed to be independent Poisson arrival processes with intensities λR and λQ,
respectively. They are emulated by Poisson traffic sources attached to each server, generating packets of 512
bytes13. The overall access rate λO = λR + λQ is set at 2s−1, and we also assume that λO = 8λR. This allows
13This is approximately the size of 〈Uc, [CtKc ]kD 〉ka , the largest message used in DICTATE, if the RSA key is 1024 bits and the
identity-based ECC key is 163 bits.
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each client to update its certificate about every 5 minutes and to query certificates of other nodes every 45
seconds, which is more than enough to meet the needs of secure communications. The value of |ΘQ¯|min is set
to 3 for all simulations.14
We assume that all replication and query requests are targeted at the same certificate. The assumption might
seem to be exaggeratedly pessimistic, because the chance that a queried certificate has just been updated is
negligible (recall that there are in total 100−19 = 81 certificates to be updated and queried). However, the goal
is to force a query to always return the result of the latest replication and thus to illustrate the lower bound of
the freshness degree that is provided by DICTATE. We term the resulting freshness degree pessimistic Fd. In
addition, we also evaluate optimistic Fd: a query is considered to be successful even if it only returns the result
of the penultimate replication.
We first investigate the impact of t (the number of compromised servers) on the performance of DICTATE,
then we show how the analytical results in Section 5.2.2 can be used to tune the freshness degree to a required
value. DICTATE is operated over 400 seconds of simulated time. The first 30 seconds of the simulation are
used for system initialization. Then each traffic source continues generating traffic according to the predefined
intensity until the end. Each simulation was carried out 10 times with different scenario files created by ns-2.
6.2 Impact of t on DICTATE Performance
We first set the fanout used for certificate replication at F = 2 and vary the number of compromised servers
t, as well as node mobility parameters. Note that we always designate the mobility pair by the maximum node
speed. As shown in Fig. 4 (a) and (b), the freshness degree Fd degrades modestly even in the worst case (i.e.,
t = 6) for low mobility scenarios (i.e., Speedmax = 2 or 5m/s). In these cases, we can claim that Fd ≥ 0.95 in
practice, considering that t = 6 is a rare case and the pessimistic Fd shows the lower bound of the DICTATE
performance. However, the effect of t is significant for high mobility scenarios (i.e., Speedmax = 10 or 20m/s).
In both cases where t = 4 and 6, the pessimistic Fd drops to values around 0.80. The system has to adjust
itself if, in such situations, a freshness degree higher than 0.90 is requested by a client. We show the tunability
of DICTATE in Section 6.3.
The network load incurred by DICTATE is shown in Fig. 4 (c). This load is reasonably low since each request
costs less than 8 unicastings on average, given that there are 2 requests per second and the expected length
of a routing path is about 2 hops (for our simulation scenarios). If a traditional access protocol were used for
14Although DICTATE may not always guarantee Fd = 1 with |ΘQ¯|min = 3 when t > 1, the simulation results show that Fd can be
made as close to 1 as possible even when t > 1.
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Fig. 4. Freshness degree Fd and network load vs. the number of compromised servers t, under four mobility scenarios. The fanout for
certificate replication is set at F = 2.
these requests, which would mean accessing DICTATE servers by multiple unicastings, the resulting load would
be much higher. It can also be observed that the larger the number of compromised servers, the lower the
load (because a compromised server drops any message instead of relaying it). Therefore, compromised servers
become “beneficial” to the system if the performance degradation is tolerable.
6.3 Tuning the Freshness Degree
As we have already mentioned, the parameter settings used in Section 6.2 are not appropriate to cope with
a large proportion of compromised servers in high mobility scenarios. So if an agent is aware of a significant
increase in compromised servers, it will adjust the parameter settings for the internal protocols. The simulations
described in this subsection illustrate how such adjustments are performed based on the analysis in Section 5.2.2,
given a required freshness degree of 0.90.
A fanout F that ensures Fd ≥ 0.90 can be deduced from expressions (3) to (5), given a particular value of
t and certain network conditions. The analytical results for t = 4 and 6 are shown by the bottom curves in
Fig. 5 (a) and (b), respectively. The simulation results also provided in these two figures further prove that the
fanouts resulting from the analysis (F = 2.7 for t = 4 and F = 3.4 for t = 6)15 indeed lead to satisfactory
freshness degrees, i.e., the experimental values of Fd are always higher than the predicted values. Of course, the
system actually trades its overhead for the freshness degree in these cases. The comparison between Fig. 4 (c)
15A real number x.y for F means that each server, when propagating a message, takes F = x with probability 1−y/10 and F = x+1
with probability y/10.
December 7, 2004 DRAFT
22
) ) )
Analysis
Simulation (Pessimistic)
Simulation (Optimistic)
t=4 F=2.7,
t=6 F=3.4,
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.90
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.90
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
Analysis
Simulation (Pessimistic)
Simulation (Optimistic)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Fig. 5. Freshness degree Fd and network load vs. the node mobility. The fanout for certificate replication is adjusted according to
analytical results, in order to cope with a large proportion of compromised servers and high node speed.
and Fig. 5 (c) shows that an increase of network load up to 50% is traded for an improvement of about 300%
of the freshness degree (i.e., 1−Fd is divided by 3) in the extreme situation: t = 6 and Speedmax = 20m/s.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on the design of a certification authority in ad hoc networks. We take a
joint authority approach that combines an off-line identification authority and an on-line distributed revocation
authority. We have then proposed DICTATE, based on our previous work on reliable group communication
systems, to control the on-line authority. The originality of DICTATE includes i) flexible certificate management
protocols with tunable freshness to trade overhead for robustness, and ii) provable robustness against various
attacks, especially Byzantine failures of the DICTATE servers.
Our proposed specification of distributed CA with probabilistic freshness takes the peculiarities of ad hoc
networks into account. As a consequence, the freshness property can be sacrificed to some extent, in the case
that the required freshness degree is low and the network resources are scarce. In order to meet the specification,
DICTATE is implemented in a “closed” server group backed by an identity-based cryptosystem, so that the
Sybil attack is thwarted and messages from individual servers are universally verifiable. Also, the authority
employs threshold cryptography to distribute trust in order to tolerate a certain number of compromised servers.
Finally, DICTATE relies on a probabilistic group communication system, PILOT, to propagate certificate updates,
replications, and queries to its server group, which guarantees a certain probability, rather high in practice, for a
query to obtain the latest status of a certificate. Despite the seeming complexity, DICTATE executes automatically
without the need of any human involvement.
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We have identified potential attacks against DICTATE and evaluated the robustness of DICTATE through
detailed security analysis. We notice that one of these attacks, called inaction DoS (iDoS) attack, is a serious
threat to DICTATE; we have thus verified the system performance under such attacks by simulations. The results
show that (i) iDoS attacks can only have a marginal effect on the performance of DICTATE in low node speed
scenarios and (ii) increasing node speed weakens the tolerance of DICTATE to such attacks. In the latter case,
the system can be tuned on-line to trade its overhead for a higher degree of freshness. We have improved the
analytical model proposed for PILOT to predict the freshness degree of DICTATE. The validity of predictions is
evaluated by simulations, in a way that the analytical results are used as the basis to adjust system parameters
for tuning the DICTATE performance.
We are in the process of further studying the performance of DICTATE with a complete implementation. It
is also a part of our future work to consider the integration of DICTATE with potential applications such as
secure routing and secure group communications.
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